How to Stop a Nuclear War
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/05/opinion/russia-nuclear-war.html
ROSS DOUTHAT notes:
“Clear commitments — we will fight here, we won’t fight there — are the coin of the nuclear realm, since the goal is to give the enemy the responsibility for escalation, to make it feel its apocalyptic weight, while also feeling that it can always choose another path. Whereas unpredictable escalations and maximalist objectives, often useful in conventional warfare, are the enemy of nuclear peace, insofar as they threaten the enemy with the no-win scenario”
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/05/opinion/russia-nuclear-war.html
ROSS DOUTHAT notes:
“Clear commitments — we will fight here, we won’t fight there — are the coin of the nuclear realm, since the goal is to give the enemy the responsibility for escalation, to make it feel its apocalyptic weight, while also feeling that it can always choose another path. Whereas unpredictable escalations and maximalist objectives, often useful in conventional warfare, are the enemy of nuclear peace, insofar as they threaten the enemy with the no-win scenario”
NATO’s membership rules invite conflict — and
benefit Putin
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/22/natos-membership-rules-invite-conflict-benefit-putin/
Brett V. Benson and Bradley C. Smith (Associate Professors of Political Science at Vanderbilt University) note:
"International-affairs scholars know that, throughout history, few moments are more ripe for war than when the enemy of one country makes a bid to join forces with other adversaries. Such alliances can utterly transform the balance of power between two countries, and therefore, when a potential alliance is signaled but not yet consummated, the nation that will be put at a disadvantage faces a huge incentive to strike.
Ukraine’s membership in NATO was hardly imminent, but Russia felt threatened enough by the possibility that it was willing to launch a war to prevent it (in addition to other nationalist goals Putin thinks he is achieving). Recognizing the dynamic at play is the first step toward understanding the conflict — and recognizing how NATO’s membership process may unintentionally invite this kind of crisis".
Related:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/19/ukraine-russia-nato-crisis-liberal-illusions/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/22/natos-membership-rules-invite-conflict-benefit-putin/
Brett V. Benson and Bradley C. Smith (Associate Professors of Political Science at Vanderbilt University) note:
"International-affairs scholars know that, throughout history, few moments are more ripe for war than when the enemy of one country makes a bid to join forces with other adversaries. Such alliances can utterly transform the balance of power between two countries, and therefore, when a potential alliance is signaled but not yet consummated, the nation that will be put at a disadvantage faces a huge incentive to strike.
Ukraine’s membership in NATO was hardly imminent, but Russia felt threatened enough by the possibility that it was willing to launch a war to prevent it (in addition to other nationalist goals Putin thinks he is achieving). Recognizing the dynamic at play is the first step toward understanding the conflict — and recognizing how NATO’s membership process may unintentionally invite this kind of crisis".
Related:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/19/ukraine-russia-nato-crisis-liberal-illusions/
Aiding a Ukrainian Insurgency Would Be Painful and
Costly