On the Limits of Chronological Age
https://www.nber.org/papers/w33124
Abstract:
Analysis of population aging is typically framed in terms of chronological age. However, chronological age itself is not necessarily deeply informative about the aging process. This paper reviews literature and conducts empirical analyses aimed at investigating whether chronological age is a reliable proxy for physiological functioning when used in models of economic behavior and outcomes. We show that chronological age is an unreliable proxy for physiological functioning due to appreciable differences in how aging unfolds across people, health domains, and over time. We further demonstrate that chronological age either fails to predict economic variables when used in lieu of physiological functioning, or that it predicts additional effects on economic behavior and outcomes that are largely unrelated to physiological aging. Continued reliance on chronological age as a proxy for physiological functioning might impede the ability of societies to fully harness the benefits of increasing longevity.
https://www.nber.org/papers/w33124
Abstract:
Analysis of population aging is typically framed in terms of chronological age. However, chronological age itself is not necessarily deeply informative about the aging process. This paper reviews literature and conducts empirical analyses aimed at investigating whether chronological age is a reliable proxy for physiological functioning when used in models of economic behavior and outcomes. We show that chronological age is an unreliable proxy for physiological functioning due to appreciable differences in how aging unfolds across people, health domains, and over time. We further demonstrate that chronological age either fails to predict economic variables when used in lieu of physiological functioning, or that it predicts additional effects on economic behavior and outcomes that are largely unrelated to physiological aging. Continued reliance on chronological age as a proxy for physiological functioning might impede the ability of societies to fully harness the benefits of increasing longevity.
Babies and the Macroeconomy
https://www.nber.org/papers/w33311
Abstract
Fertility levels have greatly decreased in virtually every nation in the world, but the timing of the decline has differed even among developed countries. In Europe, Asia, and North America, total fertility rates of some nations dipped below the magic replacement figure of 2.1 as early as the 1970s. But in other nations, fertility rates remained substantial until the 1990s but plummeted subsequently. This paper addresses why some countries in Europe and Asia with moderate fertility levels in 1980s, have become the “lowest-low” nations today (total fertility rates of less than 1.3), whereas those that decreased earlier have not. Also addressed is why the crossover point for the two groups of nations was around the 1980s and 1990s. An important factor that distinguishes the two groups is their economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. Countries with “lowest low” fertility rates today experienced rapid growth in GNP per capita after a long period of stagnation or decline. They were catapulted into modernity, but the beliefs, values, and traditions of their citizens changed more slowly. Thus, swift economic change may lead to both generational and gendered conflicts that result in a rapid decrease in the total fertility rate.
https://www.nber.org/papers/w33311
Abstract
Fertility levels have greatly decreased in virtually every nation in the world, but the timing of the decline has differed even among developed countries. In Europe, Asia, and North America, total fertility rates of some nations dipped below the magic replacement figure of 2.1 as early as the 1970s. But in other nations, fertility rates remained substantial until the 1990s but plummeted subsequently. This paper addresses why some countries in Europe and Asia with moderate fertility levels in 1980s, have become the “lowest-low” nations today (total fertility rates of less than 1.3), whereas those that decreased earlier have not. Also addressed is why the crossover point for the two groups of nations was around the 1980s and 1990s. An important factor that distinguishes the two groups is their economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. Countries with “lowest low” fertility rates today experienced rapid growth in GNP per capita after a long period of stagnation or decline. They were catapulted into modernity, but the beliefs, values, and traditions of their citizens changed more slowly. Thus, swift economic change may lead to both generational and gendered conflicts that result in a rapid decrease in the total fertility rate.