DEMOCRACY IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES
Why America is a “flawed democracy”
EIU’s index plots the country’s democratic decline since 2006
How Capitalism Became a Threat to Democracy
https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/how-capitalism-became-a-threat-to-democracy-by-mordecai-kurz-2024-03
Since the 1980s, American capitalism has been transformed into a winner-takes-all economy in which one or a few technologically dominant firms monopolize each sector at the expense of consumers, workers, and overall growth. And with permanent market power comes the kind of political power that is antithetical to democracy.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/how-capitalism-became-a-threat-to-democracy-by-mordecai-kurz-2024-03
Since the 1980s, American capitalism has been transformed into a winner-takes-all economy in which one or a few technologically dominant firms monopolize each sector at the expense of consumers, workers, and overall growth. And with permanent market power comes the kind of political power that is antithetical to democracy.
The Cure for What Ails Our Democracy
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/15/opinion/democracy-good-evil.html
Is the rich world stuck in an ‘upper-income trap’?
https://www.ft.com/content/bc830276-c8d0-465a-88fc-e06eb83be90b
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/15/opinion/democracy-good-evil.html
https://www.ft.com/content/bc830276-c8d0-465a-88fc-e06eb83be90b
Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens by Martin Gilens (Princeton University) and Benjamin I. Page (Northwestern University); Perspectives on Politics
Abstract
Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics – which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic Elite Domination, and two types of interest group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism – offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented.
A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. This paper reports on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues.
Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.
Abstract
Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics – which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic Elite Domination, and two types of interest group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism – offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented.
A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. This paper reports on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues.
Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.
DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
For all its faults, democracy is still better than autocracy
https://www.ft.com/content/9285ed6e-fb71-4b10-bf5c-b4f83a140675
All the evidence shows that despotism cannot consistently deliver the economic goods for developing countries
Political Institutions, Economic Growth, and Democracy: The Substitute Effect
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/political-institutions-economic-growth-and-democracy-the-substitute-effect/
Economic development promotes democracy, but there’s a catch
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/29/economic-development-promotes-democracy-but-theres-a-catch/
The democratic transition by Fabrice Murtin & Romain Wacziarg
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44113423
Abstract
Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.
https://www.ft.com/content/9285ed6e-fb71-4b10-bf5c-b4f83a140675
All the evidence shows that despotism cannot consistently deliver the economic goods for developing countries
Political Institutions, Economic Growth, and Democracy: The Substitute Effect
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/political-institutions-economic-growth-and-democracy-the-substitute-effect/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/29/economic-development-promotes-democracy-but-theres-a-catch/
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44113423
Abstract
Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.