Good Enough for Government Work?
https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/good-enough-for-government-work
Cliff Winston:
Do we really know why government policies seem so inefficient, and why they are rarely reformed? For centuries, economists have been cataloguing sources of the systemic failure of markets to achieve efficient outcomes and then offering government policy fixes. By contrast, little has been written with much analytical depth about the sources of persistent government inefficiencies. The well-known political economy models of government stress the importance of organized special interests, including people in government, who engage in rent-seeking and distort policy formation and implementation or (the flip side) resist efficient policy changes. But as we shall see, the evidence of what’s really going on is weak even if one includes both the conventional “demanders” of policy, who try to purchase influence through lobbying and campaign contributions, and the “suppliers” of policy — government employees and elected officials who are influenced by their personal characteristics and the environment in which they work. The important implication is that it is exceedingly difficult to infer how government can overcome its failures and improve its policies. In contrast, markets have the incentive and ability to correct their own failures over time.
https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/good-enough-for-government-work
Cliff Winston:
Do we really know why government policies seem so inefficient, and why they are rarely reformed? For centuries, economists have been cataloguing sources of the systemic failure of markets to achieve efficient outcomes and then offering government policy fixes. By contrast, little has been written with much analytical depth about the sources of persistent government inefficiencies. The well-known political economy models of government stress the importance of organized special interests, including people in government, who engage in rent-seeking and distort policy formation and implementation or (the flip side) resist efficient policy changes. But as we shall see, the evidence of what’s really going on is weak even if one includes both the conventional “demanders” of policy, who try to purchase influence through lobbying and campaign contributions, and the “suppliers” of policy — government employees and elected officials who are influenced by their personal characteristics and the environment in which they work. The important implication is that it is exceedingly difficult to infer how government can overcome its failures and improve its policies. In contrast, markets have the incentive and ability to correct their own failures over time.