Support from Pakistani generals and spies helped
return the Taliban to power in Kabul. Now Washington should be equally ruthless
in pursuing its own interests.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-09-16/the-u-s-should-rethink-its-relationship-with-taliban-supporting-pakistan
Taliban leaders would not hold power in Kabul today if not for Pakistani support. The haven that Taliban commanders, their families and their fighters received within Pakistan allowed the insurgents — devastated and scattered by the initial U.S. invasion in 2001 — to rebuild their ranks. For nearly two decades, elements within the Pakistani military provided money, training and logistical support to the Taliban, even as Pakistan pocketed more than $33 billion in American aid. Pakistani leaders have hardly bothered to disguise their satisfaction at the Taliban victory.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-09-16/the-u-s-should-rethink-its-relationship-with-taliban-supporting-pakistan
Taliban leaders would not hold power in Kabul today if not for Pakistani support. The haven that Taliban commanders, their families and their fighters received within Pakistan allowed the insurgents — devastated and scattered by the initial U.S. invasion in 2001 — to rebuild their ranks. For nearly two decades, elements within the Pakistani military provided money, training and logistical support to the Taliban, even as Pakistan pocketed more than $33 billion in American aid. Pakistani leaders have hardly bothered to disguise their satisfaction at the Taliban victory.
The time for equivocating about a nuclear-armed, Taliban-friendly Pakistan is over
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/23/john-bolton-taliban-takeover-pakistan-extremists/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/23/john-bolton-taliban-takeover-pakistan-extremists/
What’s 50 Times More Dangerous Than Afghanistan?
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-withdrawal-afghanistan-pakistan-nuclear-lashkar-e-taiba-tehreek-e-taliban-islamist-11629402468
Sadanand Dhume notes:
“Between 2002 and 2018, the U.S. government gave Pakistan more than $33 billion in assistance, including about $14.6 billion in so-called Coalition Support Funds paid by the Pentagon to the Pakistani military. (Donald Trump ended nearly all military assistance and also slashed nonmilitary aid from its peak in the Obama years.) During the same period, Pakistan ensured the failure of America’s Afghanistan project by surreptitiously sheltering, arming and training the Taliban”.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-withdrawal-afghanistan-pakistan-nuclear-lashkar-e-taiba-tehreek-e-taliban-islamist-11629402468
Sadanand Dhume notes:
“Between 2002 and 2018, the U.S. government gave Pakistan more than $33 billion in assistance, including about $14.6 billion in so-called Coalition Support Funds paid by the Pentagon to the Pakistani military. (Donald Trump ended nearly all military assistance and also slashed nonmilitary aid from its peak in the Obama years.) During the same period, Pakistan ensured the failure of America’s Afghanistan project by surreptitiously sheltering, arming and training the Taliban”.
The Real Failure Is Pakistan
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pakistan-is-real-cause-of-failure-in-afghanistan-by-bill-emmott-2021-08
Bill Emmott notes:
The biggest failure in the aftermath of 9/11 was the failure to secure long-term support from the front-line states surrounding Afghanistan: Iran, China, Russia, Central Asia’s five “Stans,” and India, but above all Pakistan. To be sure, support would never have been forthcoming from some of them. But Pakistan had long been a recipient of American aid, military and otherwise, and was considered a US ally during the Cold War. The fact that it was also snuggling up to China, and that its nuclear-weapons program benefited from Chinese support and technology, ought to have been viewed as an indicator of its slight commitment to the American camp.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pakistan-is-real-cause-of-failure-in-afghanistan-by-bill-emmott-2021-08
Bill Emmott notes:
The biggest failure in the aftermath of 9/11 was the failure to secure long-term support from the front-line states surrounding Afghanistan: Iran, China, Russia, Central Asia’s five “Stans,” and India, but above all Pakistan. To be sure, support would never have been forthcoming from some of them. But Pakistan had long been a recipient of American aid, military and otherwise, and was considered a US ally during the Cold War. The fact that it was also snuggling up to China, and that its nuclear-weapons program benefited from Chinese support and technology, ought to have been viewed as an indicator of its slight commitment to the American camp.