As China transitions away from investment-led growth, it
will obviously import less commodities (or, at least the growth rate of
commodity imports will decline). Also, it will be useful to keep in mind that
the real imports (quantity) data may diverge from the value of imports when
global commodity prices slump. What is puzzling is the weakness in China’s
export growth – the world economy may be weaker than widely assumed:
http://blogs.reuters.com/macroscope/2015/09/08/chinas-falling-imports-an-ominous-sign-for-the-global-economy/
Related -
http://blogs.reuters.com/macroscope/2015/09/08/chinas-falling-imports-an-ominous-sign-for-the-global-economy/
Related -
Henny Sender’s interesting take on China –
“Beijing
understands way better than the Americans (or the current regime in Tokyo or at
the Bank of Japan) that monetary policy alone cannot be the catalyst for
economic growth. And the Chinese government has both the will and the resources
to pursue more aggressive fiscal policy.
While it is true
that the efficacy of investment has fallen, any veteran of the US long distance
railway, Amtrak, even at its best, can testify to the value of China’s fast
speed trains as they travel the 1,500km between Beijing and Shanghai at 300km
an hour.
It is also worth
recalling that 25 years ago, many analysts dismissed prosperous Pudong as a
white elephant. Yet Shanghai, like an elephant growing into its wrinkled skin,
has long since grown into the gleaming glass towers of Pudong across the
Huangpu river”.
Capital Economics China Economist Julian Evans-Pritchard